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The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Eastern Africa
István Tarrósy1
This chapter deals with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the 
ambitious vision of China to increase its connectivity with the 
African continent, across which it has managed wide-scale engage-
ments since the launch of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) summitry in 2000. This complex geopolitical tool for 
enhancing China’s position has been substantially gaining ground 
in Africa. However, this has not been without adverse outcomes. 
Via infrastructure development projects, African states arguably 
enter dynamics that reproduce dependency – this time, on China 
(Taylor, 2014). While Africans also need to engage in meaning-
ful trade, strategies for cooperation on the African side seem to be 
weak or missing. This is evident when we look at recent Chinese 
infrastructure developments and the responses and perceptions to 
these projects by locals in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Rwanda. 
Attention will be directed towards China’s strategy of offering 
attractive loans that indebt African governments over the long term. 
Case studies will include railway projects in Kenya and Ethiopia, 
airport extensions in Kenya and Tanzania, and building projects in 
Rwanda. The chapter will argue that among the multiple local views 
towards increasing Chinese presence, there is growing resistance in 
some localities, such as from the Kenyan group called ‘Save Lamu’, 
which attempted to stop a China-backed coal-fired power plant (see 
French, 2015, for a detailed discussion of local views). While the 
‘charm offensive’ (Kurlantzick, 2007) is still part of China’s prag-
matic foreign policy, execution of the BRI has made inadequate 
provisions for the management of local resistance and fears. Backed 
by field trips and interviews in all the four countries, as well as based 
upon media coverage/news analysis, this contribution will cover both 
the Chinese and the African angles and shed light on these struggles.
1 The author holds the János Bolyai Research Scholarship and his work is 
supported therefore by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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China going global along one belt and many routes
By the end of the 1990s, China appeared assertively on the inter-
national stage by fostering its ‘Going Global’ strategy, which later 
offered a foundation for launching its Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI). The Chinese government explicitly urged both state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private firms to penetrate markets glob-
ally, taking advantage of a dynamic new phase of world trade and 
the hunger of developing regions for investments in infrastructure. 
President Xi Jinping’s leadership has been pushing the new initiative – 
formally called the ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR), ୍⸍୍㊰ in 
Mandarin, built on the ancient first Silk Road network from the 
Han dynasty – also with the aim to improve and strengthen its 
geopolitical position in its immediate neighbourhood, as well as 
in a larger regional, global context. Two routes exist: one by land 
stretching across the ancient Silk Road network (and well beyond) 
and a maritime route (see Figure 9.1). The two are connected, 
resulting in ‘one belt’, and the BRI is a well-planned smart power 
strategy, which aims to wrap the entire world, not only Eurasia 
and Africa, and which has become the leitmotif of China’s foreign 
policy (Brînză, 2018).
A report published by the research and strategic advisory think 
tank China Policy in April 2017 clearly shows the systematic and 
Figure 9.1 – The Belt and Road Initiative Maritime Route
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strategic development of China’s global expansion. After bidding 
farewell to the Mao-era mind-set of self-reliance, the new strategy 
frames China’s ambitions for global leadership and cooperation 
(China Policy, 2017:3). Following its joining of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001 and having experienced (and survived 
with confidence) the global financial crisis in 2008–2010, China’s 
BRI focuses on building up infrastructure, trade, investment, and 
human linkages across Eurasia (China Policy, 2017:7), connect-
ing almost all regions of the world to a ‘peacefully rising’ Middle 
Kingdom of the 21st century. Africa is one of the target continents, 
where Chinese engagement has a long history.
The official Chinese communication dates Sino-African rela-
tions back to Han times (206 BC to AD 220) when the Chinese 
reached Egypt by overland routes (Jalata and Mathews, 2017:73). 
One of the leading symbols of today’s Chinese Africa policy is 
Admiral Zheng He, who in the early 15th century – more than 
70 years earlier than the first European (the Portuguese Vasco da 
Gama) reached the Swahili shores – realised influential voyages 
across the Western Ocean and, thereby, China–Africa relations 
were brought to a new historic level (Li, 2017: 253). Admiral 
Zheng He is frequently referred to in both the political and pub-
lic discourses of historically long friendly ties, and at the same 
time has been used as an ‘item’ to confirm Chinese ‘aspira-
tions of centrality’ (Taylor, 2006:2). Since 2000, when the first 
FOCAC was held in Beijing, the real pragmatic face of China 
has been dominating Sino-African relations, which also signals 
a new era in Africa’s interaction with the outside world (Alden, 
2007:2). Chinese political and business actors, together with 
entrepreneurs have regarded Africa as a continent of economic 
potential populated by consumers, as well as a place for Chinese 
companies to gain experience, and establish and expand busi-
ness ventures into the global arena (Alden, Large, and Oliveira, 
2008:7). As Africa welcomes any competition that shakes up the 
Western, Lebanese, and Indian business monopolies (Michel 
and Beuret, 2009:7), with its highly enhanced, complex, and, 
at the same time, focused engagements, China is welcomed by 
most African governments. With China’s accelerated involve-
ment in African development; more and more Africans say that 
China has won the ‘new scramble’ for Africa. This engagement, 
however, has stirred mixed reactions. African leadership sees this 
relationship as a golden opportunity. However, Africa’s people 
have yet to see if they (or just their leaders) would benefit in 
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the long run (Chidaushe, 2007:107). Despite these misgivings, 
it must be noted that China has recently built the sorely needed 
infrastructure that can enhance Africa’s connectivity across 
global networks. Local Africans certainly praise this input. At the 
same time, the deals that finance such projects raise several ques-
tions, of which the same local population is hardly aware. Their 
governments need to start to repay the ‘soft loans’ provided 
by China, but in a growing number of cases, their budgets are 
unable to cover them. Such scenarios may, therefore, reproduce 
more dependency. The rise of new dependencies has already 
been discussed by scholars such as Taylor, (2014), and as a 
‘sub-imperialist logic’ of behaviour, by Bond (2015) and Van der 
Merwe (2016). Another direct consequence of China’s Africa 
policy needs further attention: the rapid rise of Chinese migrants 
in Africa and the consequences of their presence in different 
African localities. There has been a marked rise in the number 
of Chinese people on African soil since the launch of FOCAC, 
precipitating multiple local views and perceptions. In the follow-
ing section, we will look into who these Chinese nationals are 
and what challenges they present both for the Africans and the 
Chinese government in the long run.
More Chinese migrants, more questions for Africa
Many authors, including Mohan and Tan-Mullins (2009), Park 
(2013), and Li (2017), mention that data about Chinese pres-
ence in Africa is somewhat speculative. Figures are elastic and 
estimates of the number of Chinese migrants range from one to 
two million. There are several factors to consider in this regard. 
First, the term ‘Overseas Chinese in Africa’ can mean various 
things, with broad and narrow definitions, including distinctions 
between earlier and more recent migrants, and between those 
from mainland China as opposed to those from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Macau (Li, 2017:275). Apart from the numerous 
Mandarin terms (such as Huaqiao ⌵ᾏ, Huayi ⌵墻, Haiwai 
Huaren 㵞⣽⌵ạ), ‘the Chinese’ are a diverse group both cul-
turally and linguistically (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009:591). 
During the last few decades the presence of Chinese nationals 
in Africa has demonstrated a changing pattern: as opposed to 
the flow of contracted workers of large state-owned companies 
driven by the central will of the Chinese government, recently, 
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migration has moved to being largely independent of state action 
(Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009:592). So far, much less attention 
has been paid to these people and gaining a better understanding 
of their intentions and activities. French also confirms that while 
large-scale projects completed by big, government-owned compa-
nies dominate the headlines about the advancing Chinese agenda 
in Africa, the reality is more meaningfully shaped by the deeds 
of countless smaller actors (2015:5). They also contribute to an 
expanding circle of perceptions, which accommodate many views 
and reactions to the Chinese, which vary from country to country 
and within countries (Park, 2013:131). In an interview, Denise 
A.O. Kodhe, director general of the Institute for Development 
and Leadership in Africa (IDEA), based in Nairobi, Kenya, pre-
sented the increasingly vocalised view that China’s entry into 
Africa is based on a strategy to 
tie African governments down with massive loans so that the 
Chinese get what they want. These loans in Kenya are running 
into billions of Schillings, and as Kenyans, we are really worried 
when this money will be paid back and if not paid, what will 
happen.2 
As for interactions between Chinese and Africans on the ground, 
Kodhe thinks that in some cases 
Chinese investors bribe their way through and are not interested 
in establishing long-term social relationships to bring themselves 
closer to the people of Africa. In short, it is a marriage of 
convenience, which is likely to explode at some point.
It is not only the Africans that do not know the extent and 
nature of Chinese migration to Africa. Chinese authorities also do 
not have a complete picture of the growing Overseas Chinese pop-
ulation in Africa. From the African perspective, Hannah Postel 
(2016) articulates a valid point when she says that better under-
standing the Chinese communities on the continent is necessary 
for African countries to make this growing trend as productive 
and sustainable as possible – for the sake of Africa’s planned long-
term development.
2 Recorded by the author on 6 May 2018.
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Chinese infrastructure projects linked to BRI: 
financial challenges, tensions, and emerging 
sentiments across East Africa
Kenya
The issue of knowledge and technology transfer has been promi-
nent in the discourse of Sino-African relations for a long time. Africa 
needs to learn how to run and maintain the projects that had been 
put together by Chinese actors. In the case of infrastructure projects, 
who operates a light rail or railway, in the long run, does affect local 
perceptions. In an exclusive report in The Standard, Wafula (2018) 
reveals the enormous challenges of the working conditions at the 
385-km-long Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) of Kenya. This rail-
way line, which is very much a BRI project, connects Nairobi with 
Mombasa on the coast and is the largest single infrastructure develop-
ment project in the country at present. Those who were trained two 
years ago in anticipation have remained assistant shunting drivers, 
since the launch of Madaraka express, and only sit and watch as the 
Chinese drivers drive to the coast and back. ‘We just sit at the back 
and watch. There is no actual transfer of skills that is happening here’, 
an assistant locomotive driver who has been with the SGR for over a 
year now told The Standard (Wafula 2018). In addition to the lower 
wages for the same jobs, together with the more menial tasks allocated 
to them, local Kenyan workers do not see the path of development for 
themselves and their country under such circumstances.
As for the environment, there are further negative consequences, 
which have alarmed wildlife activists: more and more animals are 
being run over by the train, and there are no safety or protective 
measures. Already at the end of 2015 Nelson summarised some of 
the most critical local opinions in the Kenya Monitor: both Nairobi 
residents and the Conservation Alliance of Kenya (CAK) opposed 
the routing of the SGR. Their biggest concern was that the railway 
would affect the national park it runs through and cause unaccep-
table social impact by displacing thousands of people from their 
homes, including ancestral homes, causing a loss of open spaces, 
affecting air quality, increasing pollution, affecting health negatively, 
and reducing recreational space. These detrimental effects are in 
addition to causing irreparable ecological damage through habitat 
degradation, especially through the loss of rare indigenous forests 
and wildlife, and the reduction of the rich biological diversity of the 
city (Nelson, 2015). Their voices were not heard.
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The other crucial question also connected with this railway pro-
ject concerns its finances and financial sustainability. In a Sunday 
article, referring to data from the Kenyan Treasury, the Business 
Daily (2018) emphasised that loan repayments to China’s ExIm 
Bank – which lent US$3.233 billion to build the railway – will 
more than triple from July 2019 as the five-year grace period that 
Beijing extended to Kenya in March 2014 for the project funds 
comes to an end.
Another more recent instance of local experience with a China-
funded project seems to be the country’s first coal-fired power plant 
in the historic port town of Lamu. The New York Times reports that 
while Kenyan officials say that the plant will help meet the coun-
try’s fast-growing demand for electricity and draw investment, 
critics worry that it will damage the area’s fragile marine ecosys-
tem, threaten the livelihoods of fishing communities, and pollute the 
air (Sengupta, 2018). The multinational Chinese company Power 
China is behind the scenes and is ready to ‘help’ as soon as the ongo-
ing lawsuit which was filed by a local group in the Kenyan National 
Environmental Tribunal in November 2016 is over. The plant would 
also be connected to one of the largest multifaceted infrastructure 
developments in Kenya. The Kenya Port Authority translates this 
as one of the flagship infrastructure projects identified by the gov-
ernment in Kenya Vision 2030, which is the development of a new 
transport corridor linking a new and modern Port of Lamu with 
landlocked Ethiopia and South Sudan. For many local households 
whose land has been acquired for the project the promised financial 
compensation seems to be insufficient when they think about their 
future. One activist of the group Save Lamu said: ‘You can never 
get enough compensation to evacuate everyone’ (Sengupta, 2018).
Ethiopia
There are numerous examples of the tangible manifestation of 
China’s Africa policy all across Africa. Recent large-scale projects 
have directed the spotlight on Ethiopia. There, Chinese presence 
has already been overwhelming. They have developed the first mod-
ern light railway (tram) system of sub-Saharan Africa in the capital, 
Addis Ababa. The Chinese were also instrumental in the Addis–
Djibouti railway connecting the landlocked country to the maritime 
trade routes of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (see Tarrósy and 
Vörös, 2018a; 2018b). These initiatives yet again aim at improving 
the country’s port access, with land having been acquired to set 
up a logistics facility in the Lamu Port, Kenya. One of the main 
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features of Ethiopia’s developmental state is the construction of 
large projects, such as railways, highways, hydroelectric dams, and, 
more recently, the plan for the expansion of the capital city, known 
as the ‘Addis Ababa Master Plan’ (ZáhoĜík 2017:259). The con-
struction of the light rail system started in December 2011 after 
securing funds from China’s Export-Import Bank (ExIm Bank). 
The final cost of the railway was US$475 million, 85 per cent of 
which was covered by a substantial concessional loan from ExIm 
Bank, China. It took three years for the China Railway Group 
Limited (CREC – the acronym of the parent company meaning 
China Railway Engineering Corporation) to finish the two-line, 
34.4-km system. Trial operations started in February 2015, while 
the lines started to operate by 20 September and 9 November 2015 
respectively.
The original plan was to ease the overburdened traffic situation 
in the capital, but according to Tesfaye (2015), it failed to do so. 
The number of those using the tram – around 110,000 daily pas-
sengers in a city of around seven million inhabitants – shows it has 
limited relevance: with very low ticket prices, the train is compara-
ble to the cost of a bus trip. However, the light rail is overcrowded 
with a limited network. The number of trams should be increased, 
but according to the news and locals, the system is limited because 
of power issues and even with the recent increase in the number of 
trams it runs infrequently or with single cars. Promises were made to 
install a dedicated power grid, but even it fails to power the system.
The Addis–Djibouti railway is an almost 760-km-long rail-
way connection between the capitals of Ethiopia and Djibouti, 
constructed between 2011 and 2016, financed by the Ethiopia 
government and by a loan from China’s ExIm Bank. Details again 
are not entirely clear, but according to the Embassy of Ethiopia 
in Brussels (2016), the total construction budget reached US$4.5 
billion, at least US$0.5 billion more than was initially planned. 
According to various sources, ExIm Bank provided a loan of around 
US$2.4–3.0 billion. In 2017, the Ethiopian Railway Corporation 
(ERC) faced financial issues without finishing the project and the 
connecting infrastructure on time. Anberbir (2017) reported that 
the ERC had a stunning US$3.7 billion in debt by the end of 2016, 
and had already started to repay those loans before the railway con-
nection was functional.
As was the case with the Light Railway System, this railway is also 
operated by a Chinese company, in this case, a consortium of two 
companies, CREC and the China Civil Engineering Construction 
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Corporation (CRCC), which were responsible for the construction 
as well. Their job now is to operate and maintain the line and to also 
train local personnel for an undisclosed fee until 2023.
This project, similar to the Light Railway System, fails to meet its 
original goals, which has financial consequences as well. While the 
light railway was mainly constructed to ease the traffic issues, this 
railway was built to help the landlocked country to reach maritime 
trade routes, also to import much-needed fuel, as well as to boost 
the economy. Failing to generate the income to repay the loans 
might have negative consequences on the ERC and future projects 
as well, not to mention on the Ethiopian government.
Tanzania
Neighbouring Tanzania also has a massive port project – the Port 
of Bagamoyo, which is roughly planned to be completed between 
2020 and 2021. Set to be the largest port in East Africa, Bagamoyo 
is an important junction on China’s new Maritime Silk Road. It is 
not surprising that part of the necessary funding will come from a 
Chinese entity, the China Merchants Holdings International, which 
partnered for the project with Oman’s State Government Reserve 
Fund. Some say that the project presents an opportunity to test the 
potential of this Maritime Silk Road as a game changer for Africa’s 
development (Léautier, Schaefer, and Wei, 2015). The US$10 bil-
lion project will contain another Chinese element adapted to the 
Tanzanian context: an Export Development Zone (EDZ), a kind 
of special economic and trade area, with an industrial city and even 
more infrastructure connectivity. Some locals, however, feel threat-
ened and think that their natural habitats will be endangered – in 
particular, such rich ecosystems as the nearby mangrove swamps, 
as well as the fishing waters that provide income to many families. 
Trade imbalances that heavily favour China may also fuel rising 
negative sentiments about the Chinese. The Chinese have not been 
consuming as much of either Tanzania’s or Kenya’s products as 
Africans have spent on Chinese goods. As Omondi (2018) under-
lines, Kenya has even made overly generous concessions which have 
allowed China to bring products such as onions and fish into the 
country which can easily be locally sourced.
Bagamoyo, however, is only one of the 12 ports – the so-called 
Strategic Maritime Distribution Centres (SMDCs) – along the 
Maritime Silk Road. Out of the 12 strategic ports seven are located 
along African coastal regions. The entire concept (or geopoliti-
cal vision) is about a network with China in the centre (as the real 
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Middle Kingdom again) and all other partnering actors, who are 
interested in facilitating trade for their own sake. Eyler (2014) rightly 
points out that this growing network’s ocean-bound cargo fleet’s 
ships, whether coming or going, are never empty, and China, sitting 
at the helm of this network, receives the lion’s share of income and 
resources from trade.
Although the SMDCs collectively are not explicitly part of BRI, 
the broader SMDCs (presented in Figure 9.2) contextualise BRI 
within a bigger network of Chinese shipping, significantly expanding 
the reach of China’s trade. China’s expertise in infrastructure devel-
opment assists developing countries in clearing their infrastructure 
backlogs, thereby facilitating enhanced trade. It concentrates on 
modernising and constructing transportation networks linking 
hubs, ports, or important cities in order to allow fast and undis-
turbed trade (Krukowska, 2016:159–160). BRI is at the centre of a 
vast maritime and trade network, therefore, which, as a vehicle may 
also contribute to raising the geopolitical importance of the African 
coastal regions.
Rwanda
For any investment, a politically and economically stable and secure 
environment is a prerequisite. Some actors are less cautious than 
others, but security is of utmost importance to each of them. To be 
Figure 9.2 – Strategic Maritime Distribution Centres
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able to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), Africa needs to work 
out policies and daily behaviours which can convince any possible 
investor to enter their markets. African countries differ regarding 
their levels of armed conflict and the openness and regional inte-
gration of their markets. This affects what they can offer for their 
potential trade partners and investors. Although Chinese actors 
had shown bravery in some cases in the past to enter unreliable 
markets, today, the Going Global strategy of the People’s Republic 
of China advocates more caution and calculation in any investment 
or acquisition scheme. Those countries with more safeguards (and 
still with ‘room to manoeuvre’ for the sake of the best deal) can 
expect larger volumes of Chinese money and engagement. One 
of the best examples for this is the small landlocked East-Central 
African country of Rwanda.
One of the vehicles of the country’s transformation is the Rwandan 
Development Board (RDB). It focuses on investment promotion 
and contributes to a services-oriented economy for the future. As 
Yvette Mutoni, former head of investment promotion in RDB, 
explained in an interview, tourism has been planned to become one 
of the main drivers of a brighter future. In particular, conference 
tourism with all the newest and modern facilities in Kigali City is 
meant to position Rwanda as the leading actor in East Africa.3 To 
be able to attract more companies into this sector the RDB offers a 
one-stop centre to register any company in the country: in just about 
six hours on the ground floor of the RDB building, all the necessary 
paperwork can easily be done, for instance. Also, the government 
has been making progress in bringing down the costs of running any 
business, especially concerning electricity costs. Another significant 
step to attract FDI is to provide transparent procurement proce-
dures. Proposals are double checked in all sectors, and the state 
organ responsible for all this is the Rwanda Standards Board (RSB), 
governed by the board of directors, which is composed of major 
stakeholders from government, industry, and academic institutions, 
as well as consumer associations.
With regard to construction, especially that of the badly needed 
physical infrastructure across the country, the role of external actors 
was highlighted in an interview with President Kagame in the Cabinet 
Meeting Room in the Presidency Compound on 24 March 2015. 
President Kagame acknowledged that the ‘Chinese are everywhere, 
3 Interview recorded by the author on 24 March 2015, in the headquarters of 
the RDB.
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in Europe, as well. If this is good for Europe, why cannot it be good 
for Africa?’ He also added that if ‘things go wrong [in a project, for 
instance], it is not only the Chinese’ fault because if things do not 
have ownership, things cannot be going into a good direction’.4 Paul 
Kagame certainly referred to his firm belief in ‘home-grown solu-
tions’, which presuppose an able African agency to make decisions on 
behalf of the society. All these statements also highlight the stubborn 
approach required for the future: African countries need to go their 
own way in a systematic and also self-critical manner, always learning 
from both their past and the current successes and failures of others. 
China, from this angle, is undoubtedly a point of reference for many, 
including Rwanda. The important thing missing, as many analysts 
agree, is African countries’ China Policy, a comprehensive approach 
towards China’s engagements with African countries. Under such 
circumstances, individual countries could well be encouraged to 
develop their national policies on China (Chidaushe, 2007:111). 
These policies should be firm and confident.
Rwanda’s government has been accelerating its policy on local-
ising the industrial sector. Its ‘Made in Rwanda’ initiative aims to 
increase the export of more locally made products worldwide. In 
Kigali, a Special Economic Zone was established, which also hosts 
a Chinese-owned textile factory. As Jarvis (2018) reports, this 
Chinese investment and industry knowledge have helped to develop 
a state-of-the-art textile factory that manufactures clothing for both 
the international and national markets. According to Jolly Rubagiza, 
deputy director general of the Rwanda Management Institute, 
the Chinese presence in Rwanda is not very much visible in 
everyday business as it may be in other East African countries. 
Only a few restaurants and retail businesses, but still limited. Most 
of the Chinese are into road and building construction, therefore, 
Rwandan people do not seem to be that grieved.5
Prospects for changing negative perceptions?
Who is expected to change these negative perceptions after all? First, 
as the four cases have shown, there are similarities and apparent dif-
ferences at the same time among different localities. Therefore, their 
4 Interview recorded on 24 March 2015, in Kigali.
5 Interview recorded by the author on 21 May 2018.
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perceptions differ about the ‘other’, in our discussion, the ‘other’ 
being ‘the Chinese’. Second, to provide an effective response, both 
government and individual contexts must be examined. From the 
Chinese government’s perspective, when African civil society organi-
sations point at worrisome developments regarding either social or 
environmental impact, China is often quick to react and offer to fund 
a ‘social good’ such as building a hospital or providing financial assis-
tance towards solving the perceived problem (Rebol, 2010:173). It is 
also true that China’s general approach towards African partnerships 
is to offer ‘package deals’, including infrastructure development, 
financial aid or developmental assistance. With this, they incorpo-
rate soft power elements such as a Confucius Institute and a quota of 
scholarships; a new stadium; a hospital and/or several new schools, 
all for a longer term mining concession or large-scale investment 
project. At the individual level, local African businesses can tap 
into and learn from their Chinese counterparts’ business networks 
(Bräutigam, 2003:447). For African actors, such relations can help 
to achieve better and more enhanced connectivity. African networks 
can take advantage of specific kinds of global trade links to form 
very helpful connections with networks in other parts of the world 
(Bräutigam, 2003:467) – in our discussion, via a dense network of 
Chinese businesses and individuals. For African governments, the 
development of ‘African agency’ is a key task to decide upon the 
best pragmatic deals while managing healthy competition between 
many external actors. Amid rising concerns caution needs to be 
taken to ensure that China is not another version of an imperialist 
state (Chidaushe, 2007:113). For the individual Chinese, to build 
up and run a profitable business is the core objective. However, their 
behaviour, the relationships they form with Africans, the way they 
conduct their business, their respect or lack thereof for the law, for 
local customs, for the environment, and, above all, for the people, 
will do more to determine China’s image (French, 2015:6).
Conclusion
Africa’s prospects may be bright if there is proper connectivity into 
global structures, there are confidently managed societies, with 
improved leadership, and there is better governance. Many of the 
continent’s countries have been fostering complex and intensive 
relationships with China, which have continuously deepened and 
strengthened since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 
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(Stewart and Li, 2014:24). China has a clear and well-articulated 
strategic policy towards the continent, where countries partnering 
with China have yet to translate their recognition of China’s impor-
tance into explicit China strategies (Omondi, 2018, referring to a 
2017 McKinsey report). African governments obviously welcome 
China-built infrastructure projects. The question frequently asked, 
however, will stay with us: Can Africa decide what the best option 
is, and under what circumstances any such development should take 
place? As Su (2017) underscored in a piece in The Diplomat, African 
states are likely to require more than just portions of their limited 
budgets to complete repayment. We may not agree with Su’s view 
on ‘a brand-new type of neocolonialism’, but we can also point out 
African vulnerability, which is – in these cases in relation to Chinese 
infrastructure loans – which surely escalate African dependence on 
China. The four cases from East Africa presented some challeng-
ing scenarios for both African governments and local communities. 
Although the much-needed railway connections, together with the 
new ports and additional infrastructure developments are all part of 
China’s comprehensive ‘Belt and Road’ vision, they also enhance 
Africa’s participation in global processes. Many lessons, however, 
need to be learnt about how to manage disappointment and frustra-
tion, and how to demand proper behaviour from any external actor 
on African soil. So far, the BRI has not paid attention to such ‘soft’ 
requirements. The recent eastern African examples will most prob-
ably push the Chinese government to consider these aspects, too. 
China might become increasingly reactive to avoid being associated 
with negative headlines (Rebol, 2010:174–175) and compel its busi-
ness entities and citizens to ‘behave’.
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